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Abstract
Mental health disorders account for a significant share of the overall global disease bur-
den and translate into staggeringly large economic losses, particularly in low-income
countries, where people are faced with several unexpected shocks. We test whether
improved communication can mitigate such mental health disorders. Partnering with
a major telecommunications company, we implement low-cost communication interven-
tions that provide mobile calling credits to a nationally representative set of low-income
adults in Ghana during the COVID-19 pandemic. Individuals’ inability to make unex-
pected calls, need to borrow SOS airtime, and to seek digital loans decreased signifi-
cantly relative to a control group. As a result, the programs led to a significant decrease
in mental distress (-9.8%) and the likelihood of severe mental distress by -2.3 percentage
points (a quarter of the mean prevalence), with null impact on consumption expen-
diture. The effects are stronger for monthly mobile credits than a lump-sum. Simple
cost-benefit analysis shows that providing communication credit to low-income adults
is a cost-effective policy for improving mental health. Communication – the ability
to stay connected – meaningfully improves mental well-being and interventions about
communication are particularly valuable when implemented as many installments.
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I Introduction
Imagine that you are unable to communicate – to make a phone call, use the web, access
social media, and so on – when the need arises unexpectedly. Does this matter for individuals’
mental and economic well-being? Should communication interventions during pandemics be
applied as a one-time large transfer or as numerous small installments? How valuable or cost-
effective is a policy that provides communication credit to low-income adults for improving
mental health? We use evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic to address these important
questions.
Throughout the world, major communication interventions have been initiated in the
public and private sectors in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In the United States,
ATT Inc. provided free 10GB of internet data per month for 60 days as temporary relief
for eligible customers to enable them to stay connected during lockdown, starting March
27, 2020 (ATT Inc. 2020).1 In Ghana, the government reduced the Communication Service
Tax (CST) from 9% to 5%, which reflected a reduction in the cost of mobile talk time and
data purchases, effective from September 15, 2020, in response to the economic and social
hardships induced by the pandemic (Ghana Revenue Authority 2020; Figure A5). The need
for such communication programs is particularly crucial in developing countries where the
informal sector is large and the COVID-19 crisis presents a substantial threat to individuals
who face credit, savings, and psychological stressors and constraints (Banerjee, Niehaus, and
Suri 2019). Despite the increase in these communication-based programs globally, there is
relatively little evidence on their impacts on well-being during a pandemic.
Administrative data on mobile financial transactions from a major provider in Ghana
sheds light on the potential value of communication during the pandemic. Figure A6 shows
1As the leading provider of mobile services in the US, with about 40% share of the market,
ATT Inc.’s initiative affected a significant number of people, particularly those in the low-
income communities. Others telecommunications companies, such as Comcast Corporation,
have deployed similar interventions, providing essential internet and mobile services with-
out charge to low-income families, including seniors, veterans, and people with disabilities
(Comcast Corp. 2020). We provide a global review of COVID-19-induced communication
programs in Tables A8 and A9.
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the distribution of transactions and illustrates that while overall market activity decreased
following the onset of the pandemic, interestingly and in contrast, the demand for mobile
airtime-related activities (as measured by the purchase of data and airtime amounts, and
thus their demand) sharply increased over the period. This descriptive evidence documents
the importance of communication during the pandemic and is congruent with our baseline
surveys: 68% of individuals indicated that their need to call or connect with others (family,
friends, employers) had increased due to the COVID-19 pandemic and its disruptions. Yet,
between 52% and 62% indicated that, sometimes, when the unexpected need arises, they are
not able to call or connect with their family and friends due to economic hardships associated
with the pandemic. Thus, programs that directly mitigate such binding communication
barriers will likely have a larger impact on individual and societal well-being.
We use a randomized controlled trial (RCT) to estimate the impacts of a short-term
“mobile phone calling credit” among a nationally representative set of low-income households
in Ghana during the COVID-19 pandemic. We draw on an existing nationally representative
baseline frame (Ghana Living Standards Survey 7 [GLSS7]), and focus on 1,131 low income
individuals or households that are readily reachable by phone, work in the informal sector,
and are located in the bottom 75th percentile of the income distribution. This sample is
low income, where income and psychological constraints (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013)
can easily bind due to pandemic-induced economic losses, and spans 193 districts across the
country’s ten administrative regions.
We partner with a major local telecommunications company to run our experiment by
randomly assigning the 1,131 individuals to two candidate communication programs: 40GHS
(US$7.0) lumpsum mobile credit (376 individuals) versus 20GHS (US$3.5) monthly install-
ments of mobile credit over two months (371 individuals) versus a control program (384
individuals); and then measuring how these affect individuals’ ability to mitigate unex-
pected communication constraints during the pandemic, with impacts on well-being, that is,
mental health, domestic violence, and consumption expenditures. The different programs
3
about communication provide a means of examining how communication programs might
be delivered: one-time large communication transfer versus numerous small installments.
The pandemic uncovered a great deal of mental health crises, which have potentially
large short- and long-term impacts on human capital development. Mental health disorders
account for 13% of the overall global disease burden (Collins et al. 2011) and translate
into significant economic losses, particularly in low-income environments (Adhvaryu et al.
2019). The direct economic impact of COVID-19 in these environments is high and includes
earnings and consumption shortfalls (Banerjee et al. 2020), food insecurity (Laborde et al.
2020), among many other meaningful negative impacts.
Conceptually, programs that facilitate communication during unexpected pandemics could
be transformative for people, particularly if bound by internal constraints. Not having to
worry about the inability to stay connected could free up the mental and emotional band-
width (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013) needed to thrive through a pandemic and its prevailing
uncertainty. The provision of communication credits during these hardships can also directly
free up an individual’s resources that would otherwise have been allocated to communica-
tion for other consumption expenses. Our interventions are designed to both relax such
communication constraints and test their impact on mental health, domestic violence, and
consumption expenditures.
We first conduct three baseline survey waves prior to the deployment of the communication
interventions. After fielding the first round of interventions (lumpsum and first installment),
we conducted two endline survey waves to track the various outcomes. Our final dataset
is unique due to its size and national representativeness, the expansive set of outcomes,
the administrative data on mobile financial transactions, and 1×3 random variations for
communication at the individual level. We find five set of results:
First, as a first stage, the interventions decreased unexpected communication constraints
significantly. That is, our experimental interventions mitigate individuals’ inability to meet
unexpected communication needs and stay connected (-37pp=-74% for inability to make
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unexpected calls, -22pp=-78% for unexpected need to borrow airtime, and -3.5pp=-44% to
seek digital loans). These effects are larger and more sustained over time for the installment
communication credit program compared to the lumpsum credit.
Second, we find meaningful improvement in psychological well-being, which is measured
using the Kessler Psychological Distress Scale (K10). Mental distress decreased (-9.8%).
Severe mental distress decreased (-2.7pp=-26%) relative to a control group. The installment
communication credit program had larger and more sustainable effects compared to the
lumpsum credit. Relatedly, only the installment program led to a significant decrease in the
overall likelihood of individuals threatening their partners by -6.3% (but with no impacts on
the overall likelihood of individuals hitting their partners – our second measure of domestic
violence).
Third, we find a null improvement in direct economic well-being. The overall effect is
null on total consumption, which is reassuring since the size and specificity of our inter-
vention were not large enough to meaningfully change consumption. Only the installment
communication intervention increased consumption expenditures, but the size is very small
economically and only in endline wave 2.
Fourth, what drives the estimated impacts? We examine heterogeneity in treatment
effects along four dimensions: poverty, informality, gender, and lockdown. For poverty
(Schreiner 2015), the estimated modest reduction in domestic violence is more significant for
the very poor. For informality, individuals in the informal sector experienced significantly
larger and better mental health improvements. For gender, female respondents experienced
slightly better mental health effects but this is not statistically significant, while for lock-
down, individuals located in areas which were previously in lockdown are more eager to
re-allocate their budgets to more consumption (utilities and durables, as expected). These
are individuals who might still be battling the persistent economic impacts of the COVID-19-
driven lockdowns. The results show that our communication impacts likely operate through
these relevant channels.
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Fifth, the marginal value of public funds (MVPF) (Hendren and Sprung-Keyser 2020) for
a policy that provides communication credit to low-income adults is 2.04, suggesting that
US$1.0 of spending on this communication credit policy delivers more than US$1.0 in benefits
to its beneficiaries. We show robustness of the various findings to the post-double selection
LASSO estimation procedure (Belloni et al. 2014), including adjustments for multiple testing
(Romano and Wolf 2005) and attrition (Lee 2009; Behaghel et al. 2015).
We make four main contributions. Mitigation of pandemics can be a daunting task. Pol-
icymakers battle on various fronts: tackling the spread of the pandemic while easing the
potential welfare impacts of the negative income shock and constraints on individuals and
households. Our programs relax binding communication constraints (individuals inability to
meet unexpected communication needs and to stay connected) and allow us to provide the
first experimental evidence on the impact of communication interventions from a nationally
representative set of low-income individuals on overall well-being and gender relations during
pandemics. The provision of phone credit may also be a way to encourage people to remain
indoors during lockdown, helping to reduce infection during the pandemic. Thus, our re-
sults add to the space of potentially resilient policy initiatives aimed at tackling pandemics
(mitigating their impacts).
We contribute to several distinct literatures. First is the economics literature on in-
terpersonal transfers following semi-covariate unexpected shocks (Blumenstock, Eagle and
Fafchamps 2016; Pulver 2009; Jack and Suri 2016). We look at a fully-covariate and pro-
longed shock and randomized communication transfers. There is almost no work on mental
health and economic impacts of information and communications technology (ICT) (Jensen
2007). We offer short-run causal view of what communication does to mental health, con-
necting ICT and mental health. Lastly, we add to the growing research on mental health
and economic impacts of disease epidemics (Adhvaryu et al. 2019; Banerjee et al. 2020;
Archibong and Annan 2020). We cleanly isolate ICT and document how to rely on it to
mitigate the mental health impacts of pandemics and epidemics.
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II Experiment: Setting and Design
II.1 A Brief Global Review: Communication Interventions
Despite their prevalence, we are not aware of any review that highlights COVID19-induced
communication interventions. We begin with a careful and ambitious (yet incomplete) global
search of communication-related initiatives that were introduced in response to the COVID-
19 pandemic. Details are shown in Tables A8 and A9. Our review shows that several
communication interventions in different forms and scales (spatial and temporal) have taken
place during the crisis. Despite their prevalence and potential importance, there is poor
evidence on the impacts of such programs during the pandemic on individuals’ economic
and psychological well-being.
II.2 Research Context
Our study is set in Ghana. Mobile phone connection penetration is very high: mobile cellular
subscriptions were 134 per 100 people in 2019 (rising from 70 per 100 people in 2010), even
among the poor (World Bank 2020). We draw on an existing nationally representative
baseline frame (GLSS7) of low income people in Ghana, which is housed by the implementer
of our surveys (Ghana Statistical Service [GSS]). We focus on poor and largely married
(91%) individuals (household heads), with over 22% poverty rates and have mobile phone
and connection access that is readily reachable by phone.
Similar to many countries, the pandemic in Ghana has had economic impacts well beyond
its health impacts, due to the restrictions on mobility and interactions that it triggered. Fol-
lowing the arrival of the first COVID-19 case in Ghana (March 03, 2020), the President Nana
Akufo-Addo announced a lockdown in the two most economically active regions (namely, the
Greater Accra Metropolitan Area and the Greater Kumasi Metropolitan Area) on March 30,
which was later followed by a nation-wide closing of all schools and a ban on other activities
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and which extended to these affected regions.
People were advised to stay at home and were only permitted to leave their homes for
essential items such as food, medicine, and water, or to visit the bank and public toilets.
Intercity travel for private and commercial purposes, except for essential goods and ser-
vices, was suspended. In terms of intracity travel, vehicles drivers were obliged to reduce
their number of passengers to observe social distancing. The borders were closed to all but
returning Ghanaians and foreign nationals with Ghanaian residence permits, who were sub-
ject to a 14-day mandatory quarantine if the returnees showed symptoms of the virus. From
April 20, 2020, the lockdown was removed and some of the restrictions were relaxed, yet
individuals continue to battle with the persistent impacts of these restrictions and prevailing
uncertainties.
Individuals in our surveys are much aware of the pandemic and its associated restrictions
on economic activities. Almost 100% of individuals indicated being aware of COVID-19 and
the restrictions, and 79% trust the government and the media to provide accurate statistics
(cases, deaths) of the pandemic. Meanwhile, 68% of individuals reported their need to call
or connect with others (family, friends, employers) has unexpectedly increased, yet over 52-
62% are sometimes unable to connect as a result of the pandemic and its hardships. This
is meaningful as 77% of the respondents are self-employed, 18% are located in previously
locked-down regions, and 80% are involved either fully or partially in the informal sector.
Table A13 contains more detailed summaries.
II.3 Measurement of Key Outcomes
We define the various outcome measures: communication constraints-mitigation, mental
health, domestic violence, and consumption expenditures: Communication constraints-(un)mitigation
measures the incidence of “(un)mitigated” mobile calls and transfers – asking whether indi-
viduals were unexpectedly confronted with the need to call or connect with others (family,
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friends, work) but unable to do so because they lacked enough communication resources to
remedy the costs. Under such dire and unexpected situations (as it has been during the
pandemic), individuals either borrow airtime (i.e., in-kind SOS credit with a service charge
of 10% and fully repayable once subscribers recharge their phone accounts with an amount
that is more than the outstanding SOS credit amount) or seek digital loans (i.e., short-term
digital but cashable loans with an interest of 6.9% over 30 days) from telecommunications
providers. Therefore, we measure communication constraints-(un)mitigation also based on
the incidence of borrowing airtime or seeking digital loans due to unexpected circumstances
to connect with others.2
Consumption expenditures are measured across food (inside and outside home), utilities,
personal care, education, health, and durables (economic well-being). Mental health is mea-
sured by the incidence of mental distress (using Kessler Psychological Distress Scale (K10))
(psychological well-being). K10 values can range from 0 (minimum) to 50 (maximum), and
values above 30 are classified as severe mental distress (Adhvaryu et al. 2019). Gender
relations reflect domestic violence (DV) and specifically elicit from an individual whether
he/she either threatened or hit his/her partner (Banerjee et al. 2020).3 We take advantage
of our short research instrument, which is limited in space, to measure additional variables:
individuals’ characteristics (poverty, age, gender, educational-level, occupation, etc.), aware-
ness and beliefs about COVID-19, and foregoing COVID-19 impacts and communication
constraints. We adapted a recently developed shortcut – yet rigorous, inexpensive, simple
and transparent – measure of poverty called the “Simple Poverty Scorecard” (Schreiner 2015;
2Unexpected communication needs are plausibly random, with higher potential for more
distress compared to needs that are expected. There is room to adjust or plan for expected
needs. Thus, communication is likely more valuable to individuals when faced with unex-
pected needs because of the less room to adjust.
3We pre-specified our three primary outcomes in the AEA RCT registry (AEARCTR-
0006104): (i) Information and communication-sharing (value, as measured by: unmitigated
calls); (ii) Expenditures on and conditional transfers; and (iii) Mental health, happiness and
gender relations. Two other outcomes that are not used were pre-specified. The experimen-
tal design: 2 treatments (lump-sum vs installments) and 1 control program, stratified by
localities (or districts) was also pre-specified. Without loss, we implemented monthly rather
than pre-planned weekly installments to ensure better administrative oversight in the field.
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Annan 2020). These variables are used to test for randomization balance and explore het-
erogeneity in treatment effects. Summary statistics of the various well-being measures are
contained in Table A13. See the Appendix for specific questions and possible responses to
relevant select variables.
II.4 Intervention and Timetable
We evaluate the impacts of two communication programs: lumpsum mobile credit versus
installments of mobile credit. Our goal is to mitigate binding communication constraints
during the pandemic that render (potentially marginal) individuals unable to connect with
others when the unexpected need arises. The timetable of baseline and endline activities
is displayed in Figure 1. We use the administrative (transaction-level) data to calculate
the 50th (75th) percentile purchase for airtime and data combined over the data period
to be 188GHS (308GHS) per month. We set the total value of our communication credit
intervention for each individual to 40GHS, that is, 21% of the median monthly purchase,
or equivalently, 13% of the 75th percentile monthly purchase. We estimate this amount as
sufficient to cover the most basic unexpected communication needs over a month or two.
We first conduct three baseline survey waves prior to the deployment of the communication
interventions, which include:
• Treatment program I (Lump-sum): individuals received 40GHS as mobile credit
for one time (not discounted).4
• Treatment program II (Installments): 40GHS was split into two and individuals
received this as mobile credit in installments (20GHS two times with a month interval
4At a monthly nominal discount rate of 1.16% (i.e., an annual rate of 14% in Ghana,
see: https://www.bog.gov.gh/treasury-and-the-markets/interbank-interest-rates/), the net
present value terms of the 20GHS installment transfers is 39.31GHS, which is around the
40GHS lumpsum transfer. Due to the short period of time (i.e., one month interval between
the two 20GHS installments), we expect discounting to have little or no effect.
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between the two).
• Control program: individuals received no mobile credit.
The communication credit could be used to make a phone call, transfer airtime, visit the
web, or access other social media services. After fielding the first round of interventions
(lumpsum and first installment), we conducted two survey waves (endlines) (see Figure 1).
As shown in Figure 1, we started with n=1,993 individuals reachable by phone in baseline
step 0 to arrive at n=1,131 eligible and select individuals in baseline step 1.
II.5 Treatment Assignment
We use a 1x3 factorial design, randomizing a total of 1,131 representative individuals into
3 experimental communication programs: lumpsum mobile credit (376 individuals), install-
ments of mobile credit (371 individuals), and control program (384 individuals). We strat-
ified based on districts, and all misfits were resolved and randomly assigned. The values
of the two treatment programs are equal, as specified above. We partnered with a major
telecommunications company to directly deliver the mobile credits.
II.6 Balance and Validity of Design
II.6.1 Balance
We base our treatment analysis on a comparison of individuals that received the communi-
cation treatments with those who did not receive the treatments. Successful randomization
of treatments, and thus identification, requires that the assignments to treatments (i.e.,
lumpsum credit versus installments credit) are independent of any relevant individual-level
statistics. To test that these individuals are comparable, we run the regression:
yid = α + βMi + ǫid
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on the baseline data (waves 1 and 2), where Mi = 1 if individual i in district d received
a communication credit treatment, and 0 otherwise. We consider the various treatments
separately and together (pooled) for a number of different outcomes and show that indi-
viduals show no observable differences across the two groups. Tables A10 and A11 report
the pre-treatment balance results and provide strong evidence in favor of randomization bal-
ance with no difference across individuals in assigned (treated) and non-assigned (control)
programs.
II.6.2 Attrition
Our randomization is based on the selected individuals that draws on the baseline GLSS
data files and step 0. Table A12 displays the breakdown of response rates and attrition be-
tween baselines and endlines. Here, attrition may be linked to individuals non-response and
inability to reach the participants either because their phone numbers are inactive or out of
network coverage area. To maximize response rates, trained field officers conducted multiple
phone calls (see Figure A7) at different time horizons of the day, varying either weekdays
or weekends, combined with step 0 that introduced the project and solicited the consent of
the individuals. If we aggregate all the data rounds, we record an overall attrition rate of
6.5%, which is low, given uncertainty during the pandemic. In our empirical estimations, we
evaluate and formally show robustness to attrition by treatment status.
III Experiment: Results
We present and discuss the treatment effects. Since all our treatments are about commu-
nication (or mobile calling) credit provision, we first report the (combined) pooled effect of
communication credit assignment, and then the separate effects for the different treatments.
III.1 Empirical Specifications
We estimate treatment effects using the model:
yidt = βMid + X
′
ivdξ + ηd + µt + ǫidt
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which links various outcome(s) yidt of individual i in district d at date t to the random
treatment variable(s) Mid, district-level (stratification unit) dummies ηd, date of survey
fixed effect µt (absorbs waves), and additional vector of controls Xivd which include the
baseline outcomes. For the pooled effects, Mid is a 0-1 indicator for whether an individual
received any of the communication programs, and thus β captures the (pooled) treatment
effect. For the separate effects, Mid is a 0-1 indicator for whether an individual received a
specific communication program. We denote by β1 and β2 the separate treatment effects for
lumpsum and installments programs, respectively (i.e., β = (β1, β2)
′).
We take a theory-driven approach and use machine learning (specifically LASSO) to select
which out of the long list of controls Xivd we should include. We do this using the post-
double-selection LASSO technique of Belloni et al. (2014). The post-double-selection LASSO
for estimating the impacts deals with potential covariate imbalance (if any), and thus we can
achieve good estimation performance, in addition to minimizing researcher degrees of freedom
and the possibility for p-hacking. For our main results, standard errors are clustered at the
individual level (the level of treatment) to account for arbitrary correlations (Cameron and
Miller 2015). Clustering at district-level yields same inference. To address the potential issue
of multiple testing, we adjust p-values for multiple testing across family of outcomes following
the procedure presented in Romano and Wolf (2005). To evaluate and show robustness for
potential attrition bias, we report Lee (2009) attrition bounds (trimming based on observed
attrition rates; see Table A12), Imbens and Manski (2004) confidence sets, and Behaghel et
al. (2015) attrition bounds (trimming based on the number of times individuals were called
before answering the phone survey; see Figure A7).
III.2 Treatment Effects
III.2.1 Communication – Ability to Stay Connected
Do communication credit interventions matter for individuals communication? We begin
by asking whether the communication programs mitigated individuals’ communication con-
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straints. Table A1 shows the pooled treatments effect for alternative communication out-
comes. Relative to a control group, individuals inability to make unexpected calls for the
previous 7 days decreased (-37pp = -74% of control mean), inability to make unexpected
calls due to COVID-19 decreased (-17pp = -38%), unexpected need to borrow SOS airtime
decreased dramatically (-22pp = -78%), and seeking digital loans decreased (3.5pp = 44%)
as a result of the communication programs. Table 1 reports the separate treatment effects
for each communication program. The installment program produces significantly larger
mitigation of the communication constraints compared to the lumpsum (p-value < 0.01).
These results strongly confirm that the interventions mitigated individuals’ binding com-
munication barriers during the pandemic period, showing economically a large and statisti-
cally significant decrease in individuals’ inability to communicate and stay connected.
III.2.2 Psychological and Economic Well-being
Do communication interventions matter for well-being? We next evaluate how the com-
munication programs impacted various well-being outcomes. Table A2 shows the pooled
treatments effect on consumption expenditures. Table A3 displays the pooled result for
mental health (measured using the Kessler Psychological Distress Scale (K10); 6 , 15 ) and
domestic violence. We find null effect on total expenditures, which is reassuring since the
size and specificity of our intervention were not large enough for it to be plausible to find
meaningful impacts on consumption. There are, however, economically very small positive
effects only for utilities and durables. In contrast to the null effect on consumption, we
find meaningful impacts on psychological well-being: mental health and domestic violence.
Mental distress (measured by logK10) decreased by -9.8%. Individuals were -6.3% less likely
to threaten their partners relative to the control group, but with no effect on the likelihood
of hitting their partners. Similarly, table 2 reports the separate treatment effects, showing
larger treatment effects of the installment intervention on mental distress, severe mental
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distress (measured by K10 values > 30), and on domestic violence measures. Individuals in
the installment credit are less likely (-2.3pp ≈ -24%) to suffer the incidence of severe mental
distress. There is limited effect of the lumpsum credit on severe mental distress. For con-
sumption, the separate effects are null and indistinguishable across the two communication
treatments, which is not surprising because of the the overall null pooled treatments effect
on consumption expenditures (table A2)
For potential dynamic effects, figs. A1, A2, and A4 show the results over the trajectory
survey by survey. What is significant to note is that the installment program has larger
and more sustainable effects compared to the lumpsum, with the exception of consumption.
This may reflect either time inconsistency or social pressure problems from receiving one-time
large transfers.
III.3 Heterogeneous Effects, Discussion and the Value of Communication
III.3.1 Heterogeneous Effects
What drives the estimated impacts? We examine heterogeneity in treatment effects along
four dimensions: poverty, informality, gender, and lockdown (results shown in tables A4-
A7). The estimates show that our communication impacts operate through the following
relevant channels. For poverty, the estimated modest reduction in domestic violence is more
significant for the very poor, while for informality, individuals in the informal sector expe-
rienced significantly larger and better mental health improvements. Next, for gender, the
female individuals experienced slightly better mental health effects but this is not statis-
tically significant, while for lockdown, individuals located in previously locked-down areas
are more eager to re-allocate their budgets to more consumption (specifically, to utilities
and durables, as expected). The latter reflects individuals who might still be battling the
persistent economic impacts of the COVID-driven lockdowns. These results are in the right
direction, and thus reassuring and provide corroborative support for our main findings.
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III.3.2 Discussions
We document the well-being impacts of providing low-cost in-kind communication transfers.
A natural question is how does such in-kind transfers compare to cash transfers? Our experi-
ments did not include a separate treatment program for cash, but one can draw some insights
from the ongoing large literature on cash transfers during the pandemic (see e.g., Banerjee
et al. 2020). In rural Kenya, Banerjee et al. (2020) examined the effects of a Universal Basic
Income (UBI) during the COVID-19 pandemic using a large-scale experiment, showing mod-
erate to no improvements on mental health measures. For context, their cash interventions
transferred $0.75 per day (amounting to a non-discounted total of about $23.3 per month)
to the beneficiaries, which is much larger than the cash equivalence of our in-kind communi-
cation transfers, yet we find meaningful improvements on our mental health measures. We
do not find any impact on food consumption (table A2) and therefore no impact is likely to
be found on hunger, but Banerjee et al. (2020) reported modest UBI improvements on food
consumption (meat/fish) and hunger. Thus, it seems communication transfers might yield
larger improvements in mental health relative to cash transfers. We think the in-kind mobile
communication transfers reduce potential behavioral barriers that would otherwise prevent
the individuals from harnessing the mental health benefits of communication.
III.3.3 The Value of Communication
To put our causal estimates into context, we consider the cost-effectiveness of providing
communication credit to low-income adults. To compare the cost of a policy that provides
communication transfers with the associated benefits, we adapt Hendren and Sprung-Keyser
(2020)’s cost-benefit framework that is conducive to welfare analysis. Specifically, we cal-
culate the marginal value of public funds (MVPF), which estimates the ratio of society’s
willingness to pay for the provision of communication credit to the net cost to the govern-
ment (here, an “imagined” funder) of implementing this policy. We estimate a conservative
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MVPF of providing communication credit to be 2.04. This suggest that US$1.0 of spending
on this communication credit policy delivers more than US$1.0 in benefits to its beneficiaries
(see Appendix section V.8 for detailed discussions).
IV Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic uncovered a great deal of economic and mental health crises, most
particularly for those people bound by credit, savings and psychological constraints. This
paper provides new experimental evidence on the impact of providing communication trans-
fers. Communication during pandemics meaningfully matters for well-being. Our mobile
credit interventions led to a notable decrease in unexpected communication constraints; in-
dividuals were better able to mitigate their inability to meet unexpected communication
needs and stay connected. As a result, the programs led to meaningful well-being improve-
ments, particularly on mental health, but modestly on domestic violence, and null on overall
consumption expenditures.
In terms of policy and design, communication initiatives that relax potential communica-
tion constraints improve psychological well-being and, to a modest degree, reduce domestic
violence. However, these programs are more valuable if implemented in numerous install-
ments of communication transfers, rather than one-time. Simple cost-benefit analysis shows
that providing communication credit to low-income adults is a cost-effective policy for im-
proving mental health. There is almost no work linking mental health and information
and communications technology (ICT) (Jensen 2007; Blumenstock, Eagle and Fafchamps
2016). We offer a short-run causal view of what communication does to mental health, using
evidence from an unexpected pandemic.
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Date of phone survey
Note: Figure shows the timetable of baseline and endline data collection activities. The various bars reflect the daily number of phone calls
or individuals surveyed. The baseline involves three panel survey waves (step 0, wave I and wave II). These waves provide information to
determine eligible individuals and to conduct pre-intervention randomization balance tests. The endline involves two panel waves (wave III
and wave IV) that follow the first round of interventions deployment (Intervention I). Intervention I (the lumpsum and the first tranche of





Table 1: MITIGATION OF COMMUNICATION CONSTRAINTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unable to Call, 7days 0-1 Unable to Call, COVID19 0-1 Borrow SOS Airtime 0-1 Seek Digital Loan 0-1
Treatment: Lumpsum -0.282*** -0.119*** -0.184*** -0.024*
Credit (β1) (0.0239) (0.0244) (0.0200) (0.0134)
Lee (2009) Attrition Bounds [-0.108, -0.069] [-0.038, 0.001] [-0.088, -0.049] [-0.033 0.005]
Imbens-Manski (2004) CS [-0.137, -0.042] [-0.069, 0.030] [-0.114, -0.029] [-0.055, 0.0197]
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.138
Treatment: Installments -0.439*** -0.225*** -0.265*** -0.046***
Credit (β2) (0.0225) (0.0240) (0.0191) (0.0131)
Lee (2009) Attrition Bounds [-0.310, -0.289] [-0.197, -0.176] [-0.190, -0.169] [-0.056, -0.035]
Imbens-Manski (2004) CS [-0.337, -0.268] [-0.229, -0.148] [-0.214, -0.153] [-0.078, -0.022]
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
Observations 2,019 2,019 2,019 2,019
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey Date FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double
LASSO LASSO LASSO LASSO
Mean of dep. variable (control) 0.458 0 .415 0.265 0.073
p-value (test: β1=β2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008
Note: District is the randomization strata. The double-post LASSO specification considers all individual controls, and individual district and
survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual’s age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator
for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether
operates in the informal sector, monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school
(JHS) education, and individual’s gender. Observations are at the subject × date level. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level; the
level of treatment) are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01 (1% level), ** p<0.05 (5% level), * p<0.1 (10% level). 90% confidence sets (CS)
around attrition bounds are reported in brackets. Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction p-values (Romano and Wolf [2005]) reported
for communication outcomes family (Unable to Call, 7days 0-1; Unable to Call, COVID19 0-1; Borrow SOS Airtime 0-1; Seek Digital Loan
0-1). Behaghel et al. (2015) attrition bounds (not reported) are tighter. See Appendix section V.7 for variable definitions.
2
2
Table 2: IMPACTS OF COMMUNICATION PROGRAMS ON WELL-BEING MEASURES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total (GHS) Expenditure Threatened Partner 1-4 Hit Partner 1-4 log K10 Severe Distress 0-1
Treatment: Lumpsum 10.60 -0.043 -0.019 -0.058*** 0.012
Credit (β1) (11.35) (0.0374) (0.0372) (0.0144) (0.0084)
Lee (2009) Attrition Bounds [18.915, 16.809] [-0.084, 0.031] [-0.079, 0.035] [-0.022, 0.008] [ -0.010, 0.028]
Imbens-Manski (2004) CS [33.490, 30.054] [-0.117, 0.072] [-0.111, 0.075] [-0.045, 0.027] [-0.031, 0.039]
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction 0.495 0.514 0.970 0.009 0.217
Treatment: Installments 17.76 -0.121*** -0.079** -0.141*** -0.023***
Credit (β2) (11.82) (0.0399) (0.0383) (0.0142) (0.0060)
Lee (2009) Attrition Bounds [-15.773, 7.861] [-0.171, -0.086] [-0.136, -0.052] [-0.134, -0.119] [-0.032, -0.031]
Imbens-Manski (2004) CS [-32.233, 21.343] [-0.254, -0.045] [-0.219, -0.012] [-0.153, -0.102] [-0.040, -0.023]
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction 0.752 0.019 0.148 0.009 0.019
Observations 2,019 2,019 2,019 2,019 2,019
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey Date FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double
LASSO LASSO LASSO LASSO LASSO
Mean of dep. variable (control) 219.573 1.247 1.166 2.704 0.152
p-value (test: β1=β2) 0.703 0.023 0.116 0.000 0.000
Note: District is the randomization strata. The double-post LASSO specification considers all individual controls, and individual district and
survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual’s age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator
for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether
operates in the informal sector, monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school
(JHS) education, and individual’s gender. Observations are at the subject × date level. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level; the
level of treatment) are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01 (1% level), ** p<0.05 (5% level), * p<0.1 (10% level). 90% confidence sets (CS)
around attrition bounds are reported in brackets. Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction p-values (Romano and Wolf [2005]) reported
separately for consumption expense outcomes family (Total (GHS) Expenditure; Food-In (GHS); Food-Out (GHS); Utilities (GHS); Personal
care (GHS); Educ. (GHS); Health (GHS); Durables (GHS)), and for mental health and domestic violence outcomes family (Threatened Partner
1-4; Hit Partner 1-4; log K10; Severe Distress 0-1). Behaghel et al. (2015) attrition bounds (not reported) are tighter. See Appendix section




V.1 Further Results – Tables and Figures
POOLED ENDLINE SURVEYS
Table A1: MITIGATION OF COMMUNICATION CONSTRAINTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Unable to Call, 7days 0-1 Unable to Call, COVID19 0-1 Borrow SOS Airtime 0-1 Seek Digital Loan 0-1
Treatment: Communication -0.371*** -0.357*** -0.194*** -0.172*** -0.226*** -0.221*** -0.0336*** -0.0347***
Credit (β) (0.0238) (0.0214) (0.0262) (0.0215) (0.0177) (0.0185) (0.0117) (0.0119)
Observations 2,045 2,019 2,045 2,019 2,045 2,019 2,045 2,019
District FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Survey Date FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Controls None Post-Double None Post-Double None Post-Double None Post-Double
LASSO LASSO LASSO LASSO
Mean of dep. variable (control) 0.498 0.498 0.452 0.452 0.288 0.288 0.079 0.079
Lee (2009) Attrition Bounds [-0.424, -0.363] [-0.239, -0.178] [-0.282, -0.221] [-0.079, -0.030]
Imbens-Manski (2004) CS [-0.458, -0.335] [-0.273, -0.148] [-0.314, -0.197] [-0.092, -0.015]
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.029
Note: District is the randomization strata. The double-post LASSO specification considers all individual controls, and individual district and survey date
fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual’s age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs
to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector,
monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education, and individual’s gender.
Observations are at the individual × date level. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level; the level of treatment) are reported in parentheses. ***
p<0.01 (1% level), ** p<0.05 (5% level), * p<0.1 (10% level). 90% confidence sets (CS) around attrition bounds are reported in brackets. Romano-Wolf
multiple hypothesis correction p-values (Romano and Wolf [2005]) reported for communication outcomes family (Unable to Call, 7days 0-1; Unable to
Call, COVID19 0-1; Borrow SOS Airtime 0-1; Seek Digital Loan 0-1). Behaghel et al. (2015) attrition bounds (not reported) are tighter.
Table A2: IMPACTS OF COMMUNICATION PROGRAMS ON CONSUMPTION EXPENSES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total (GHS) Food-In Food-Out Utilities Personal care Educ. Health Durables
Expenditure (GHS) (GHS) (GHS) (GHS) (GHS) (GHS) (GHS)
Treatment: Communication 12.92 -6.100 2.079 4.819*** 1.776 1.125 -4.254 8.575***
Credit (β) (9.934) (5.783) (3.790) (1.707) (2.102) (2.006) (3.342) (2.702)
Observations 2,019 2,019 2,019 2,019 2,019 2,019 2,019 2,019
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey Date FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double
LASSO LASSO LASSO LASSO LASSO LASSO LASSO LASSO
Mean of dep. variable (control) 219.1 125.2 45.95 8.297 8.299 6.943 21.98 2.306
Lee (2009) Attrition Bounds [-26.423, 24.892] [-22.275, 0.426] [-9.990, 7.319] [-3.339, 5.251] [-2.645, 3.171] [-6.296, 1.679] [-13.572, -1.858] [-1.425, 9.093]
Imbens-Manski (2004) CS [-40.599, 37.968] [-29.700, 7.406] [-15.275, 11.894] [-5.524, 7.454] [-4.842, 5.434] [-8.295, 4.307] [-17.586, 2.486] [-3.177, 11.415]
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction 0.564 0.534 0.564 0.138 0.415 0.564 0.564 0.009
Note: District is the randomization strata. The double-post LASSO specification considers all individual controls, and individual district and survey date fixed effects in
the possible control set. Controls include: individual’s age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1
indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector, monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1
to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education, and individual’s gender. Observations are at the subject × date level. Clustered standard
errors (at the individual level; the level of treatment) are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01 (1% level), ** p<0.05 (5% level), * p<0.1 (10% level). 90% confidence
sets (CS) around attrition bounds are reported in brackets. Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction p-values (Romano and Wolf [2005]) reported for consumption
expense outcomes family (Total (GHS) Expenditure; Food-In (GHS); Food-Out (GHS); Utilities (GHS); Personal care (GHS); Educ. (GHS); Health (GHS); Durables
(GHS)). Behaghel et al. (2015) attrition bounds (not reported) are tighter.
Table A3: IMPACTS OF COMMUNICATION PROGRAMS ON MENTAL HEALTH AND DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Threatened Partner 1-4 Hit Partner 1-4 log K10 Severe Distress 0-1
Treatment: Communication -0.077** -0.044 -0.098*** -0.004
Credit (β) (0.0328) (0.0320) (0.0128) (0.0065)
Observations 2,019 2,019 2,019 2,019
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey Date FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double
LASSO LASSO LASSO LASSO
Mean of dep. variable (control) 1.247 1.166 2.704 0.101
Lee (2009) Attrition Bounds [-0.197, -0.056] [-0.158, -0.017] [-0.147, -0.112] [-0.025, -0.003]
Imbens-Manski (2004) CS [-0.238, -0.014] [-0.198, 0.023] [-0.168, -0.093] [-0.033, 0.006]
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction 0.128 0.633 0.009 0.633
Note: District is the randomization strata. The double-post LASSO specification considers all individual controls,
and individual district and survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual’s age,
0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator
for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector, monthly
personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education,
and individual’s gender. Observations are at the subject × date level. Clustered standard errors (at the individual
level; the level of treatment) are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01 (1% level), ** p<0.05 (5% level), * p<0.1 (10%
level). 90% confidence sets (CS) around attrition bounds are reported in brackets. Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis
correction p-values (Romano and Wolf [2005]) reported for mental health and domestic violence outcomes family
(Threatened Partner 1-4; Hit Partner 1-4; log K10; Severe Distress 0-1). Behaghel et al. (2015) attrition bounds (not
reported) are tighter.
EFFECTS OVER TRAJECTORY
















































































































Survey−level: seek digital loan 0−1
Note: Estimates are from a model that includes randomization strata (district) fixed effects, survey date fixed
effects, and double-post LASSO specification which considers all individual controls, and individual district
and survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual’s age, 0-1 indicator
for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator
for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector,
monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school
(JHS) education, and individual’s gender. Observations are at the subject × date level. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level (the level of treatment). 90% confidence intervals are displayed around the
estimates. Table of coefficients and standard errors available upon request.













































































































































Survey−level: severe distress 0−1
Note: Estimates are from a model that includes randomization strata (district) fixed effects, survey date fixed
effects, and double-post LASSO specification which considers all individual controls, and individual district
and survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual’s age, 0-1 indicator
for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator
for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector,
monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school
(JHS) education, and individual’s gender. Observations are at the subject × date level. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level (the level of treatment). 90% confidence intervals are displayed around the
estimates. Table of coefficients and standard errors available upon request.
EFFECTS OVER TRAJECTORY











































































































































































































Survey−level: seek digital loan 0−1
Note: Estimates are from a model that includes randomization strata (district) fixed effects, survey date fixed
effects, and double-post LASSO specification which considers all individual controls, and individual district
and survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual’s age, 0-1 indicator
for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator
for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector,
monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school
(JHS) education, and individual’s gender. Observations are at the subject × date level. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level (the level of treatment). 90% confidence intervals are displayed around the
estimates. Table of coefficients and standard errors available upon request.


























































































































































































































































Survey−level: severe distress 0−1
Note: Estimates are from a model that includes randomization strata (district) fixed effects, survey date fixed
effects, and double-post LASSO specification which considers all individual controls, and individual district
and survey date fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual’s age, 0-1 indicator
for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator
for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector,
monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school
(JHS) education, and individual’s gender. Observations are at the subject × date level. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level (the level of treatment). 90% confidence intervals are displayed around the
estimates. Table of coefficients and standard errors available upon request.

HETEROGENEITY IN TREATMENT EFFECTS
Table A4: IMPACTS OF COMMUNICATION PROGRAMS ON WELL-BEING BY POVERTY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total (GHS) Expenditure Threatened Partner 1-4 Hit Partner 1-4 log K10 Severe Distress 0-1
Treatment: Communication 19.05 0.023 0.009 -0.082*** 0.001
Credit (16.31) (0.0479) (0.0486) (0.0202) (0.0097)
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction 0.970 0.009 0.207 0.009 0.841
Poverty Likelihood -0.730* 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.394) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0005) (0.0003)
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction 0.009 NE NE NE NE
Credit x Poverty -0.305 -0.004** -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.477) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0006) (0.0003)
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction 1.000 0.019 0.128 0.009 0.356
Observations 2,019 2,019 2,019 2,019 2,019
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey Date FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double
LASSO LASSO LASSO LASSO LASSO
Mean of dep. variable (control) 219.5 1.247 1.166 2.704 0.101
Note: District is the randomization strata. The double-post LASSO specification considers all individual controls, and individual district and survey date
fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual’s age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs
to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector,
monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education, and individual’s gender.
Observations are at the subject × date level. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level; the level of treatment) are reported in parentheses. ***
p<0.01 (1% level), ** p<0.05 (5% level), * p<0.1 (10% level). Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction p-values (Romano and Wolf [2005]) reported
separately for consumption expense outcomes family (Total (GHS) Expenditure; Food-In (GHS); Food-Out (GHS); Utilities (GHS); Personal care (GHS);
Educ. (GHS); Health (GHS); Durables (GHS)), and for mental health and domestic violence outcomes family (Threatened Partner 1-4; Hit Partner 1-4;
log K10; Severe Distress 0-1). NE denotes not estimable.
Table A5: IMPACTS OF COMMUNICATION PROGRAMS ON WELL-BEING BY INFORMALITY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total (GHS) Expenditure Threatened Partner 1-4 Hit Partner 1-4 log K10 Severe Distress 0-1
Treatment: Communication -25.10 -0.072 -0.099 -0.008 0.001
Credit (26.17) (0.0680) (0.0669) (0.0317) (0.0096)
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction 0.990 0.297 0.297 0.138 0.237
Informal Sector 0-1 -54.66** 0.126* 0.069 0.093*** NE
(25.93) (0.0731) (0.0682) (0.0317)
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction 0.069 0.277 0.425 0.019
Credit x Informal 0-1 44.95 -0.001 0.064 -0.107*** NE
(28.63) (0.0818) (0.0799) (0.0348)
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction 1.000 0.831 0.673 0.099
Observations 2,019 2,019 2,019 2,019 2,019
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey Date FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double
LASSO LASSO LASSO LASSO LASSO
Mean of dep. variable (control) 219.5 1.247 1.166 2.704 0.101
Note: District is the randomization strata. The double-post LASSO specification considers all individual controls, and individual district and survey date
fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual’s age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs
to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector,
monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education, and individual’s gender.
Observations are at the subject × date level. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level; the level of treatment) are reported in parentheses. ***
p<0.01 (1% level), ** p<0.05 (5% level), * p<0.1 (10% level). NE denotes not estimable, which occurs due to insufficient sample from individuals in
the informal sector with severe mental distress experiences. Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction p-values (Romano and Wolf [2005]) reported
separately for consumption expense outcomes family (Total (GHS) Expenditure; Food-In (GHS); Food-Out (GHS); Utilities (GHS); Personal care (GHS);
Educ. (GHS); Health (GHS); Durables (GHS)), and for mental health and domestic violence outcomes family (Threatened Partner 1-4; Hit Partner 1-4;
log K10; Severe Distress 0-1).
Table A6: IMPACTS OF COMMUNICATION PROGRAMS ON WELL-BEING BY GENDER
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total (GHS) Expenditure Threatened Partner 1-4 Hit Partner 1-4 log K10 Severe Distress 0-1
Treatment: Communication 11.61 -0.088** -0.063* -0.089*** -0.002
Credit (11.04) (0.0360) (0.0351) (0.0139) (0.00724)
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction 0.683 0.168 0.712 0.009 0.712
Female 0-1 1.489 -0.062 -0.142* 0.021 0.002
(23.09) (0.0776) (0.0751) (0.0344) (0.0182)
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction 0.940 0.861 0.861 0.257 0.861
Credit x Female 0-1 9.465 0.062 0.132 -0.063 -0.012
(27.49) (0.0939) (0.0917) (0.0406) (0.0225)
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction 0.930 0.920 0.920 0.118 0.920
Observations 2,019 2,019 2,019 2,019 2,019
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey Date FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double
LASSO LASSO LASSO LASSO LASSO
Mean of dep. variable (control) 219.5 1.247 1.166 2.704 0.101
Note: District is the randomization strata. The double-post LASSO specification considers all individual controls, and individual district and survey date
fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual’s age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs
to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector,
monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education, and individual’s gender.
Observations are at the subject × date level. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level; the level of treatment) are reported in parentheses. ***
p<0.01 (1% level), ** p<0.05 (5% level), * p<0.1 (10% level). Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction p-values (Romano and Wolf [2005]) reported
separately for consumption expense outcomes family (Total (GHS) Expenditure; Food-In (GHS); Food-Out (GHS); Utilities (GHS); Personal care (GHS);
Educ. (GHS); Health (GHS); Durables (GHS)), and for mental health and domestic violence outcomes family (Threatened Partner 1-4; Hit Partner 1-4;
log K10; Severe Distress 0-1).
Table A7: IMPACTS OF COMMUNICATION PROGRAMS ON WELL-BEING BY LOCKED-DOWN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total (GHS) Expenditure Threatened Partner 1-4 Hit Partner 1-4 log K10 Severe Distress 0-1
Treatment: Communication 0.466 -0.085** -0.050 -0.092*** -0.006
Credit (11.05) (0.0386) (0.0377) (0.0141) (0.0072)
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction 0.802 0.495 0.86 0.009 0.673
Locked-Down 0-1 157.3*** -0.060* -0.036 0.105*** 0.001
(55.81) (0.0341) (0.0321) (0.0392) (0.0067)
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction 0.029 NE NE NE NE
Credit x Locked-down 0-1 64.46** 0.040 0.029 -0.029 0.015
(25.07) (0.0658) (0.0661) (0.0335) (0.0185)
p-value: Romano-Wolf Correction 0.267 0.009 0.039 0.029 0.534
Observations 2,019 2,019 2,019 2,019 2,019
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey Date FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double Post-Double
LASSO LASSO LASSO LASSO LASSO
Mean of dep. variable (control) 219.5 1.247 1.166 2.704 0.101
Note: District is the randomization strata. The double-post LASSO specification considers all individual controls, and individual district and survey date
fixed effects in the possible control set. Controls include: individual’s age, 0-1 indicator for whether married or not, 0-1 indicator for whether belongs
to akan ethnic group or not, 0-1 indicator for whether self employed or not, household size, 0-1 indicator for whether operates in the informal sector,
monthly personal income over an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, 0-1 indicator for whether attained junior high school (JHS) education, and individual’s gender.
Observations are at the subject × date level. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level; the level of treatment) are reported in parentheses. ***
p<0.01 (1% level), ** p<0.05 (5% level), * p<0.1 (10% level). Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis correction p-values (Romano and Wolf [2005]) reported
separately for consumption expense outcomes family (Total (GHS) Expenditure; Food-In (GHS); Food-Out (GHS); Utilities (GHS); Personal care (GHS);
Educ. (GHS); Health (GHS); Durables (GHS)), and for mental health and domestic violence outcomes family (Threatened Partner 1-4; Hit Partner 1-4;
log K10; Severe Distress 0-1). NE denotes not estimable.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A9: CONT’D: A GLOBAL REVIEW OF COVID-19 COMMUNICATION INTERVENTIONS
Setting Entity Details and source(s) Date started Date ended
Global Company- *Google has donated USD10 million for Distance Learning Fund that supports organizations across the 03/DD/2020 -
Google globe which help students who have had to adapt to online learning but do not have access to resources to do so
*Google has also partnered with many universities around the world and distributed AI tools and DD/03/2020 Ongoing
mechanisms to help them keep track of the development of COVID-19 in the world and spread information
about it for all.
Source 1: https://www.google.org/covid-19/#distance-learning
Source 2: https://blog.google/outreach-initiatives/google-org/google-supports-covid-19-ai-and-data-analytics-projects/
Global Company- *Transperfect has been translating and delivering materials and information about COVID-19 across the DD/03/2020 Ongoing
Transperfect globe. The work has been so helpful that the company won the International Business Award for COVID-19
Communication Initiatives.
*The company produced videos of COVID-19 prevention tips in more than 11 languages and personalized
it for companies for free.
Source: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/transperfect-wins-international-business-award-for-covid-19-communications-initiatives-301134747. html
Europe and Companies- These companies have been slowing down and decreasing the streaming quality of their videos since 03/DD/2020 Ongoing
United States Netflix, March in Europe and also in the US. The initiative is an attempt to help with the internet traffic and higher
Youtube, latency and packet loss caused by the high usage of the internet by households after stay at home orders
Streaming services took place in Europe and in the US.
Source 1: https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/19/tech/netflix-internet-overload-eu/index.html
Source 2: https://latest-news-viral.blogspot.com/2020/03/streaming-in-time-of-covid-19-youtube.html
Global Company- *Facebook has been partnering with governments in order to spread accurate information about the 03/DD/2020 Ongoing
/India Facebook pandemic. An interesting and important partnership was with Indiaâs government that has been relying a
lot on social media in order to spread awareness and information about COVID-19. Other than social
media, Indian local governments have also developed and used apps that monitor COVID-19 in the
country, by using Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and Artificial Intelligence (AI).
*These apps are helpful and very informative, but a significant part of the population in India does not
have access to the internet which shows how the âDigital Divideâ in India has deepened the social, health









Figure A5: COMMUNICATION PROGRAMS
V.4 Administrative Data – Motivating Evidence II






































































































































Day of Year 2020
Daily Average Purchases − Total, all
Daily Average Purchases − Total, without airtime + data
Daily Average Purchases − airtime + data only
Note: Mobile financial transaction data from a major local telecommunications company and based on 694,695 transactions (2,0751 random
unique subscribers). As displayed, average purchase (total and total without airtime + data) shown in the left vertical axis with solid lines,
while average purchase for airtime-related activities (airtime + data only) shown in the right vertical axis with a dash line. Overall market
activity decreased following the onset of the pandemic, but demand for mobile airtime-related activities sharply increased over the period.
Pre-COVID-19, these two purchases (average totals versus average airtime) look similar.
V.5 Balance and Attrition
Table A10: BALANCE TEST: PRE-INTERVENTION TREATMENT-CONTROL DIFFERENCES
Constant Lumpsum Installments
Communication Measures (Wave 1)
Unable to call in past 7days 0-1 0.647*** -0.027 -0.008
(0.026) (0.035) (0.036)
Unable to call due to COVID19 0-1 0.584*** -0.018 -0.058
(0.027) (0.037) (0.037)
Borrow airtime 0-1 (Wave 2) 0.296*** 0.030 0.039
(0.0257) (0.036) (0.036)
Seek digital loan 0-1 (Wave 2) 0.085*** 0.002 0.004
(0.015) (0.023) (0.022)
Well-being Measures (Wave 1)
Total Expenditure (GHS) 319.802*** 24.668 -7.345
(24.197) (33.046) (31.539)
Food expenses inside home (GHS) 129.899*** -3.688 -6.042
(6.464) (8.067) (6.464)
Food expenses outside home (GHS) 49.495*** 7.588 3.010
(4.369) (4.962) (5.226)
Utilities expenses (GHS) 7.071*** 4.260 -2.373
(1.846) (4.126) (2.265)
Personal care expenses (GHS) 8.352*** 0.129 -0.457
(2.446) (2.500) (2.791)
Education expenses (GHS) 6.991*** 1.619 5.491
(1.897) (3.200) (3.873)
Health expenses (GHS) 29.564*** -10.082 -3.584*
(5.528) (5.922) 7.764
Durables expenses (GHS) 3.017 15.436*** 6.529**
(1.833) (5.604) (3.101)
Threatened Partner (1(never) to 4 (very often) scale) 1.194*** 0.036 -0.026
(0.040) (0.051) (0.048)
Hit Partner (1(never) to 4 (very often) scale) 1.194*** 0.036 -0.026
(0.040) (0.050) (0.048)
log K10 2.833*** -0.012 -0.008
(0.019) (0.024) (0.026)
Severe Distress 0-1 0.103*** -0.024 0.010
(0.016) (0.022) (0.022)
I’m tired (mentally, emotionally, or socially) of COVID-19 0.527*** -0.001 0.036
(0.026) (0.035) (0.039)
Corroborative Mental Health Measures (Wave 1)
I’m depressed (1(disagree) to 5(agree) scale) 1.630*** -0.055 -0.005
(0.050) (0.066) (0.075)
I’m relaxed (1(disagree) to 5(agree) scale) 2.882*** -0.043 0.062
(0.086) (0.095) (0.093)
I’m satisfied with life, all else equal (1(disagree) to 5(agree) scale) 2.501*** -0.090 0.149
(0.080) (0.095) (0.091)
I’m satisfied with finances, all else equal (1(disagree) to 5(agree) scale) 2.057*** -0.068 0.108
(0.064) (0.073) (0.084)
Note: Observations are at the individual level. Each row is a separate regression. Clustered standard
errors (at the district level) are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Mean baseline
characteristics are also balanced across treatment arms.

Table A11: BALANCE TEST: PRE-INTERVENTION TREATMENT-CONTROL DIFFERENCES
Constant Lumpsum Installments
Baseline Controls (Wave 1)
Female 0-1 0.140*** 0.006 -0.003
(0.018) (0.022) (0.023)
Akan ethnic 0-1 0.383*** -0.023 -0.008
(0.033) (0.030) 0.034
Married 0-1 0.916*** 0.023 0.001
(0.014) (0.017) (0.020)
Attained Junior High School (JHS) 0-1 0.790*** -0002 -0.023
(0.022) (0.031) (0.029)
Household size (number) 7.300*** -0.306 -0.885***
0.273*** (0.343) (0.249)
Self employed 0-1 0.808*** -0.061 -0.020
(0.021) (0.029) (0.031)
Operates in informal sector 0-1 0.833*** -0.045 0.006
(0.020) (0.028) (0.027)
Personal income (1 to 5 scale) (monthly) 1.610*** -0.001 0.017
(0.056) (0.067) (0.072)
Self does housework during COVID19 0-1 0.171*** -0.011 -0.003
(0.019) (0.025) (0.027)
In previously lockdown region 0-1 0.186*** 0.008 -0.008
(0.046) (0.011) (0.014)
Aware of COVID-19 0-1 0.994*** 0.002 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Trust Government’s estimates about COVID-19 0-1 3.343*** 0.025 0.036
(0.052) (0.058) (0.061)
Has relocated / moved in past 7days 0-1 (Wave 2) 0.012* 0.002 0.0023
(0.007) (0.0078) (0.0067
More Baseline Controls (Wave 0)
Poverty rate (%) (Schreiner 2005) 24.035*** -2.272 -2.298
(1.569) (1.375) (1.468)
Staying together with mother 0-1 0.065*** 0.004 -0.001
(0.013) (0.017) (0.018)
Has no religion 0-1 0.054*** 0.004 -0.002
(0.011) (0.014) (0.017)
Staying together with spouse 0-1 0.891*** -0.043* -0.013
(0.015) (0.023) (0.022)
Age at marriage (Years) 24.692*** 0.186 0.472
(0.273) (0.383) (0.370)
Joint F-test (linear), p-value 0.792
Chi-squared test (probit), p-value 0.829
Note: Observations are at the individual level. Each row is a separate regression. The F and Chi-squared
tests are conducted using the pooled indicator 1(Communication Credit) as the outcome and excluding
all the communication and well-being outcomes. Clustered standard errors (at the district level) are reported
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Mean baseline characteristics are also balanced across
treatment arms.
Table A12: ATTRITION
Lumpsum Installments Control Total Attrition
STEP 0 1,993
*Verify phone numbers
*Measure poverty (Schreiner 2005)
SELECT SAMPLE (Randomized) 376 371 384 1,131
BASELINE I (Wave 1) 376 371 384 1,131 0
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (0%)
(SD=0%) (SD=0%) (SD=0%) (SD=0%) (SD=0%)
BASELINE II (Wave 2) 352 340 351 1,043 88
(93%) (92%) (92%) (92%) (8%)
(SD=24%) (SD=27%) (SD=28%) (SD=26%) (SD=26%)
ENDLINE I (Follow-up wave 3) 355 344 349 1,048 83
(94%) (93%) (91%) (93%) (7%)
(SD=23%) (SD=26%) (SD=28%) (SD=26%) (SD=26%)
ENDLINE II (Follow-up wave 4) 343 335 319 997 134
(91%) (90%) (83%) (89%) (11%)
(SD=28%) (SD=29%) (SD=37%) (SD=32%) (SD=32%)
Note: Table reports the summary statistics for the subsample that was successfully reached for a follow-up and for
the subsample that was not successfully reached in endline phone surveys. Shown for all panel waves.
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V.6 Descriptive Statistics
Table A13: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF RELEVANT VARIABLES
Mean SD N
Demographic Characteristics
Female 0-1 0.146 0.354 1130
Akan ethnic 0-1 0.362 0.481 1130
Married 0-1 0.910 0.285 1130
Attained Junior High School (JHS) 0-1 0.784 0.411 1130
Household size (number) 6.906 4.087 1107
Self employed 0-1 0.762 0.425 1130
Operates in informal sector 0-1 0.799 0.400 1130
Personal income (1 to 5 scale) (monthly) 1.621 0.897 1130
Staying together with mother 0-1 (Wave 0) 0.067 0.250 1130
Has no religion 0-1 (Wave 0) 0.053 0.226 1130
Staying together with spouse 0-1 (Wave 0) 0.869 0.337 1130
Age at marriage (Years) (Wave 0) 24.93 4.971 1083
Poverty
Poverty rate (%) (Schreiner 2005) (Wave 0) 22.04 20.53 1130
Pandemic Basics
Aware of COVID-19 0-1 0.996 0.060 1105
Trust Government’s estimates about COVID19 0-1 0.798 0.401 1105
In previously lockdown region 0-1 0.183 0.386 1130
Self does housework during pandemic 0-1 0.168 0.374 1130
Has relocated / moved in past 7days 0-1 (Wave 2) 0.014 0.118 978
Key Communication Constraints
Need to connect increased due to pandemic 0-1 0.701 0.457 1104
Unable to call in past 7days 0-1 0.627 0.483 1104
Unable to call due to COVID19 0-1 0.548 0.497 1104
Unable to make airtime transfers in past 7days 0-1 0.474 0.499 1104
Borrow airtime 0-1 (Wave 2) 0.320 0.466 978
Seek digital loan 0-1 (Wave 2) 0.087 0.283 978
Well-being Measures
Total Expenditure (GHS) (weekly) 324.1 423.2 1102
Threatened Partner (1(never) to 4 (very often) scale) 1.194 0.701 1102
Hit Partner (1(never) to 4 (very often) scale) 1.194 0.701 1102
log K10 2.819 0.369 1102
Severe Distress 0-1 0.096 0.294 1102
I’m tired (mentally, emotionally, or socially) of COVID19 0-1 0.538 0.498 1104
I’m depressed (1(disagree) to 5(agree) scale) 1.598 0.941 1102
I’m relaxed (1(disagree) to 5(agree) scale) 2.885 1.382 1102
I’m satisfied with life, all else equal (1(disagree) to 5(agree) scale) 2.534 1.318 1102
I’m satisfied with finances, all else equal (1(disagree) to 5(agree) scale) 2.073 1.156 1102
NOTE: Number of Districts, n=193, Number of Regions, n=10
Note: Observations are at the individual level. Table reports the summary statistics of relevant variables from
our baseline survey waves. This include information about demographics, poverty indicators, communication
and well-being outcomes, respectively. The exchange rate during the baseline period is US$ 1.0 = GHS 5.80.
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K10 score at baseline
Note: Observations are at the individual level. Low (scores of 10-15, indicating little or no psychological
distress). Moderate (scores of 16-21). High (scores of 22-29). Very high or severe distress (scores of 30-50).
11.5% rate of severe distress (indicated by the vertical dashed line).
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Note: Observations are at the individual level. Total consumption expenditure sums all expenses: food
(inside and outside home), utilities, personal care, education, health, and durables. 81.7% rate of poor
consumption (≤ 500GHS per week and indicated by the dashed vertical line).
V.7 Definition of Relevant Select Variables – Questions
Communication constraints (un)mitigation:
Consider the last 7 days:
1. Unable to call in past 7days 0-1: Were you confronted with the need to call
others (i.e., family, friends or work) but unable to call because you/ household
lacked enough communication resources to cover costs? 0=No, 1=Yes
2. Borrow airtime 0-1: Have borrowed airtime due to unexpected circumstances to
make calls? 0=No, 1=Yes
3. Seek digital loan 0-1: Have taken a digital loan due to unexpected circumstances
to make calls? 0=No, 1=Yes
4. Unable to call due to COVID19 0-1: Are you sometimes unable to see or communicate
with your family and friends due to COVID19, its lockdown restrictions and
other personal avoidance steps you have taken? 0=No, 1=Yes
Gender and Domestic violence relations:
Consider last 7 days: Please indicate how often you act to the following:
USE CODES:
1=Never (less than 1 time in 7 days), 2=Sometime (1-2 times in 7 days), 3=Often
(3-4 times in 7 days), 4=Very often (5-7 times in 7 days), 5=No Answer (if you
want/feel uncomfortable to say)
1. Threatened Partner 1-4: How often do you threaten to hurt your partner or someone
close to your partner?
2. Hit Partner 1-4: How often do you hit or throw something at your partner?
Mental Health (K10):
Consider last 7 days: Please indicate how often you feel about the following:
USE CODES:
1=None of the time (less than 1 time in 7 days), 2=A little of the time (1-2 times
in 7 days), 3=Some of the time (3-4 times in 7 days) 4=Most of the time (5-6 times
in 7 days), 5=All of the time (7 times in 7 days)
1. About how often did you feel tired out for no good reason?
2. About how often did you feel nervous?
3. About how often did you feel nervous that nothing could calm you down?
4. About how often did you feel hopeless?
5. About how often did you feel restless or fidgety?
6. About how often did you feel so restless you could not sit still?
7. About how often did you feel depressed?
8. About how often did you feel that everything was an effort?
9. About how often did you feel so sad that nothing could cheer you up?
10. About how often did you feel worthless?
Consumption Expenditures (weekly):
1. What is the total value (in GHS) of all food and beverage items your household
(i) purchased and consumed, (ii) consumed from your own stock or production,
or (iii) received as a gift and consumed over the last 7 days? NOTE: Please
only include food and beverage items consumed in the 7 days ...GHS
2. What is the total value (in GHS) of all food and beverage items you or any
member of your household purchased and consumed from outside the house over
the last 7 days? NOTE: This includes items purchased outside the house in
restaurants, cafeterias, canteens/kiosks, as well as products such as spirits,
tobacco, stimulants, etc. ...GHS
3. What is the total value (in GHS) of house rents, house repair costs and utilities
that were paid for, purchased, or acquired from other sources (ie gifts and
in-kind) by your household over the last 7 days? NOTE: Utilities include
sewerage, electricity, water, gas, cooking fuels, house servants, etc. ...GHS
4. What is the total value (in GHS) of products and services for personal use
and care, that were paid for, purchased, or acquired from other sources (ie
gifts and in-kind) over the last 7 days by your household? NOTE: Personal
care products and services include barber services, electrical appliances
for personal care, oils, soaps, etc. Personal use products and services include
jewelry, accessories (watches, clocks, clothing, etc.), cultural services,
mobile airtime services, financial service fees, transportation costs. ...GHS
5. What is the total value (in GHS) of education expenses (i.e., all tuition
or fees including all educational scholarships) over the last 7 days by your
household? ...GHS
6. What is the total value (in GHS) of consultation or treatment services, and
pharmaceutical or therapeutic products purchased last 7 days by your household?
...GHS
7. What is the total value (in GHS) of durable products such as furniture, electronics
and other household appliances, purchased over the last 7 days by your household?
NOTE: This includes furniture, household appliances (large and small), repair
of household appliances, miscellaneous accessories such as TVs, laptops, cars,
mobile phones, bicycles, torches, batteries, solar lamps, etc. ...GHS
8. Total expenditure: add 1 to 8 ...GHS
V.8 Marginal Value of Public Funds (MVPF)
We use our causal estimates to compute the MVPF (Hendren and Sprung-Keyser 2020) for a
policy that provides communication credit to low-income adults for two months. The MVPF
is a ratio of society’s willingness to pay (private benefit) for this policy to the net cost of the
policy to the government (here, an “imagined” funder).
V.8.1 Society’s Willingness to Pay (MVPF numerator)
We estimate this to include two main components.
First, is the averted (otherwise) social cost of mental health burden, ξ. Mental health
disorders account for 13% of the overall global disease burden (Collins et al. [2011]), which
is likely higher in low-income countries (Adhvaryu et al. [2019]); we assume 13%. Health
expenditure per capita in Ghana is US$78 (World Bank [2018]). With a treatment effect
of -10% reduced mental destress rate (or -25% for severe mental distress; we assume -
10%), we conservatively estimate the averted social cost of mental health burden to be
0.10x0.13xUS$78=+US$1.014. This ξ estimate is very conservative: Addo et al. [2013] es-
timate that the average monthly household cost of mental healthcare in Ghana is US$60.24
(i.e., 2xUS$60.24=US$120.48 for two months), so with a treatment effect of -10% reduced
mental destress rate and a national average household size of 4.5 people per household, this
will imply 0.1xUS$120.48/4.5=+US$2.68 averted social cost, which is 2.6 times larger. Sec-
ond, is the individual beneficiary’s willingness to pay for not visiting the hospital or not get-
ting mentally unwell, η. This includes three sub-components: (i) out-of-pocket health bill η1
(0.10x0.13xUS$63=+US$0.82; out-of-pocket health expense is US$63 [World Bank 2018]);
(ii) travel cost to health centers η2 (assumed to be 20% of the estimated out-of-pocket
health bill = 0.2xUS$0.82=+US$0.203; Addo et al. [2013] suggest using 74% for such in-
direct costs but we assume 20%); and (iii) lost income from missed work η3 (assumed to
be only 5% of the average earnings of non-farm enterprises = 0.05xUS$231=+US$11.55 for
two months; most individuals in our sample [around 80%] operate informal non-farm enter-
prises and the total average annual earnings of non-farm enterprises is US$1,385 in 2021 US$
[Ghana Statistical Service, GLSS 7 Table 9.6]; the treatment effects were all concentrated on
individuals operating informal enterprises, see Table A5).5
Combining all the components, the MVPF’s numerator = ξ+
∑3
i=1 ηi=US$13.590 for the
average treated individual.6.
V.8.2 Net Cost to the “imagined” Funder / Government (MVPF denominator)
We estimate this to include two main components.
First, is the cost of providing communication transfer for two months, G (+US$7.0).
Second, is the missed communication services tax (CST) revenue if individuals do not com-
municate or stay connected, µ. In Ghana, the CST is used to finance the National Youth
Employment Programme (NYEP) (≥20% of the CST) and support other national develop-
ment activities. Using the prevailing 5% CST rate (Ghana Revenue Authority [2020]), we
estimate that the government loses 0.05xUS$7.0= -US$0.35. In computing the net cost to
the government of this policy, it is important to note that (i) communication is a network
good so the ultimate economic incidence of these communication transfers extends to other
individuals: others might benefit from receiving mobile phone calls from the treated indi-
vidual (positive externalities) but this might also create congestion hassle or traffic on the
communication network (negative externalities). We assume (i) and (ii) to be equal. If the
5Informal non-farm business income may either be consumed in the household (where we
find no impacts) or invested (where our impacts are concentrated given that our treatment
effects were all concentrated on individuals operating informal enterprises).
6We drop the direct value of the communication subsidy to beneficiaries (+US$7.0) to avoid
double counting. In standard maximization models, the willingness to pay would have just
been the size of the subsidy if people are fully optimizing. Here, it is reasonable to assume
that people are not fully optimizing (see e.g., our evidence that the installment program
has larger and more sustainable effects compared to the lumpsum, with the exception of
consumption, which may reflect either time inconsistency or social pressure problems from
receiving one-time large transfers). Given this potential mis-optimization (the envelope
theorem does not easily apply and so the benefits the subsidy delivers to people are not
already captured by the subsidy), the willingness to pay includes the benefits on mental
health and its associated cost reductions (ξ and η).
positive externalities dominate, as we would expect (see Björkegren [2019] for an example in
Rwanda), then the total cost of this policy is over-estimated in this dimension. Further, we
conservatively did not factor in the reduced fiscal cost from less hospital visits generally due
to the reduced likelihood of mental health disorders.
Lastly, combining all the components, the MVPF’s denominator = G+µ=US$6.65 for the
average treated individual.
V.8.3 MVPF Estimate
Taking the ratio, we estimate a conservative MVPF of providing communication credit to
be 13.590
6.650
= 2.044. Notice that in determining the MVPF, we intentionally bias the estimates
to understate the benefits and overstate the costs. With a current total population of
about 31,732,129 in Ghana, an adult population of 18,073,230 (57% of the total population),
and the poverty rate of our study’s sample of adults being 22%, the policy’s total benefit
will be US$54,035,343 (=0.22x18,073,230xUS$13.590) against a total cost of US$26,441,135
(=0.22x18,073,230xUS$6.650).
